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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate distributed generalized
Nash equilibrium (GNE) computation of monotone games with
affine coupling constraints. Each player can only utilize its local
objective function, local feasible set and a local block of the cou-
pling constraint, and can only communicate with its neighbours.
We assume the game has monotone pseudo-subdifferential without
Lipschitz continuity restrictions. We design novel center-free
distributed GNE seeking algorithms for equality and inequality
affine coupling constraints, respectively. A proximal alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is proposed for the equal-
ity case, while for the inequality case, a parallel splitting type
algorithm is proposed. In both algorithms, the GNE seeking task
is decomposed into a sequential NE computation of regularized
subgames and distributed update of multipliers and auxiliary
variables, based on local data and local communication. Our
two double-layer GNE algorithms need not specify the inner-
loop NE seeking algorithm and moreover, only require that the
strongly monotone subgames are inexactly solved. We prove their
convergence by showing that the two algorithms can be seen
as specific instances of preconditioned proximal point algorithms
(PPPA) for finding zeros of monotone operators. Applications
and numerical simulations are given for illustration.
I. INTRODUCTIONS
Generalized Nash equilibrium and its distributed compu-
tation is an important research topic in decision making
problems over large-scale multi-agent networks. Examples in-
clude power allocation over cognitive radio networks, [1]–[3],
demand response and electric vehicle charging management
in smart grids, [4]–[7], rate control over optical networks, [8],
[9], and opinion evolution over social networks, [10], [11].
Each agent (player) controls its decision, and has an objective
function to be optimized, which depends on other players’
decisions. Moreover, each player’s feasible set can depend on
other players’ decisions through coupling constraints, such as
when they share limited network resources. Generalized Nash
Equilibrium (GNE), firstly proposed in [12], is a reasonable
solution, since at a GNE no player can decrease/increase
its cost/utility by unilaterally changing its local decision to
another feasible one. Interested readers can refer to [13] for a
review on GNE.
Distributed GNE computation methods are quite appealing
for noncooperative games over large-scale networks, in which
the local data of each player, including own objective function
and own feasible set, are kept by each player. Moreover, when
the coupling constraint is a sum of separable local functions,
it is also appealing to have each player only knowing its
local constraint function, i.e., local contribution to the coupling
constraint. Since local data is not required to be transmitted to
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a central node, the communication burden could be relieved,
and the privacy of each player gets protected. Recently, dis-
tributed NE/GNE computation methods have received increas-
ing research attention, see [2]–[7] and [14]–[24]. Different
information structures are considered, depending on whether
or not there exists a coordination center. For example, the
methods in [3] [5] [6] all utilize a central node to update
and broadcast certain coordination/incentive signals based on
all players’ decisions. Notice that [5] considers aggregative
games where the agents are coupled through aggregative
variables, hence, it is efficient to adopt a coordination center
if permitted. Meanwhile, totally center-free distributed GNE
computation algorithms have been proposed in [7], [22]–[24]
assuming that each player is able to observe the decisions
on which its local objective function or constraint function
explicitly depends on. On the other hand, in the distributed
NE computation algorithms of [19]–[21], each player is only
required to have local communications with its neighbours,
and each player computes an estimation of other players’
decisions or aggregative variables by resorting to consensus
dynamics.
Typically, the objective function of each player is convex
only with respect to its own decision. Then an NE/GNE
can be computed by solving a (generalized) Variational In-
equality (VI) problem constructed with the game’s pseudo-
gradient/subdifferential (PG/PS) [1]–[3], [7], [13]. Various
monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity assumptions on PG/PS
play a fundamental role in the design and analysis of dis-
tributed NE/GNE seeking algorithms. [3] assumes a strongly
monotone PG to get the cocoercivity of the dual operator,
and show the convergence of double-layer dual gradient GNE
seeking methods. [22] and [24] combine strong monotonicity
and Lipschitz continuity to ensure the cocoercivity of PG, and
propose primal/primal-dual gradient methods for distributed
GNE computation. [6], [11] and [18] consider aggregative
games with quadratic objective functions, hence also adopt
a strong monotone and Lipschitz PG. [20] and [23] con-
sider games with strictly monotone and Lipschitz PG. [20]
proposes a “gradient”+“consensus” algorithm for distributed
NE seeking, while [23] utilizes a continuous-time gradient
flow algorithm to seek a GNE of aggregative games. For
NE seeking with only monotone PGs, [2] proposes a double-
layer proximal best-response algorithm that involves solving
regularized subgames at each iteration, while [16] proposes
a single time-scale/layer regularized (sub)gradient algorithm
with diminishing step-sizes. For GNE seeking of monotone
games, [9] proposes a double-layer dual extragradient method
and [15] adopts the single-layer Tikhonov regularization al-
gorithm with diminishing step-sizes, both assuming Lipschitz
continuity and using a central coordinator. [7] proposes a
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primal-dual gradient algorithm, and [25] proposes a payoff-
based algorithm for GNE seeking with pseudo-monotone PGs,
both with diminishing step-sizes.
Motivated by the above, we investigate center-free dis-
tributed algorithms for computing GNE of monotone games
with affine coupling constraints. The players’ decisions are
coupled together with a globally shared affine constraint,
while each player only knows a local block of the constraint.
We consider both equality and inequality constraints which
cover many task/resource allocation games, [3], [6], [23], [24].
Compared with previous works, the key difference is that
we only assume a monotone pseudo-subdifferential without
Lipschitz continuity restrictions. We propose center-free GNE
algorithms with fixed step-sizes where each player only utilizes
its local data and has a peer-to-peer communication with its
neighbours. To the best of our knowledge, this distributed GNE
computation has not been discussed in literature under this
general form.
We adopt the variational GNE as a refined solution and
use primal-dual analysis to reformulate GNE seeking as the
problem of finding zeros of monotone operators for equality
and inequality cases, respectively. The monotone operators are
composed of a skew-symmetric linear operator (with both the
constraint matrices and a matrix related to communication
graph) and an operator involving PS. In general, the proximal
point algorithm can be applied for solving monotone inclusion
problems without Lipschitz restriction. However, it is not
directly applicable to our GNE problem because it requires to
compute the inverse of a graph-related skew-symmetric matrix,
which is prohibitive in distributed algorithms. To overcome
these challenges, we propose novel distributed GNE seeking
algorithms based on Preconditioned Proximal Point Algorithm
(PPPA), for equality and inequality cases, respectively. For the
equality case, we call it proximal alternating direction method
of multipliers (ADMM), partially motivated by [26]. For the
inequality case, we call it proximal parallel splitting algorithm,
partially motivated by [27]. Both algorithms use appropriately
chosen operators and preconditioning matrices, which ensure
that the resolvent evaluation of monotone operators is realiz-
able by local computation and communication. The proposed
algorithms decompose the GNE computation into sequential
NE computation for regularized subgames and distributed
update of local multipliers and auxiliary variables. Hence, our
algorithms are double-layer algorithms, similar to [2], [3], [9],
but the inner-loop NE seeking algorithms need not be specified
while the subgame only needs to be solved inexactly. By using
proximal terms, the subgame is regularized to have strongly
monotone PS, hence it can be efficiently solved by existing
NE seeking distributed algorithms, such as the best-response
algorithm in [2]. The inexactness in solving the subgames
is also considered and relaxation steps are applied to all
variables, which potentially could improve convergence speed.
Moreover, proximal ADMM enjoys the feature of utilizing the
most recent available information whenever possible. In both
cases, the algorithms’ convergence is proved for fixed step-
sizes by relating them to PPPA, and showing that they can be
seen as specific instances of PPPA, while PPPA’s convergence
can be shown based on averaged operator theory.
To summarize, the main contributions of this work are as
follows. (i): The game model only assumes a monotone PS
without Lipschitz continuity, hence it is a generalization of
previous ones. Both equality and inequality affine coupling
constraints are considered. (ii): Novel center-free GNE seeking
algorithms with peer-to-peer communication are introduced.
Since only monotonicity is imposed, the double-layer al-
gorithms could be implemented after the NE algorithm is
chosen tailored to the specific practical problem. Moreover,
thanks to the proximal terms, the subgames are regularized to
have strongly monotone PS/PGs, hence, could be efficiently
solved. (iii): The algorithms are related to PPPA for monotone
inclusion, revealing the algorithms’ intrinsic structure. Their
convergence is proved for fixed step-sizes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the
preliminary background. Section III formulates the noncooper-
ative game and basic assumptions. Section IV gives distributed
GNE computation algorithms for both equality and inequality
constraint cases, and analyzes their limiting points. Section
V presents the algorithms’ convergence analysis. Section VI
gives application examples and simulation studies. Section VII
draws the concluding remarks.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the notations and preliminary
notions in monotone and averaged operators from [28].
Notations: In the following, Rm (Rm+ ) denotes the
m−dimesional (nonnegative) Euclidean space. For a column
vector x ∈ Rm (matrix A ∈ Rm×n), xT (AT ) denotes its
transpose. xT y = 〈x, y〉 denotes the inner product of x, y,
and ||x|| =
√
xTx denotes the induced norm. ||x||2G denotes
〈x,Gx〉 for a symmetric matrix G. Denote 1m = (1, ..., 1)T ∈
Rm and 0m = (0, ..., 0)T ∈ Rm. diag{A1, ..., AN} repre-
sents the block diagonal matrix with A1, ..., AN on its main
diagonal. Denote col(x1, ...., xN ) as the stacked column vector
of x1 to xN . In denotes the identity matrix in Rn×n. For a
matrix A = [aij ], aij or [A]ij stands for the matrix entry in the
ith row and jth column of A. Denote int(Ω) as the interior of
Ω and ri(Ω) as the relative interior of Ω. Denote ×i=1,...,NΩi
or
∏N
i=1 Ωi as the Cartesian product of Ωi, i = 1, ..., N .
Let A : Rm → 2Rm be a set-valued operator. Id denotes the
identity operator, i.e, Id(x) = x. The domain of A is domA =
{x ∈ Rm|Ax 6= ∅} where ∅ stands for the empty set, and the
range of A is ranA = {y ∈ Rm|∃x, y ∈ Ax}. The graph of A
is graA = {(x, u) ∈ Rm×Rm|u ∈ Ax}. The inverse of A is
defined via graA−1 = {(u, x)|(x, u) ∈ graA}. The zero set
of A is zerA = {x ∈ Rm|0 ∈ Ax}. The sum of A and B is
defined as gra(A+B) = {(x, y + z)|(x, y) ∈ graA, (x, z) ∈
graB}. Define the resolvent of A as RA = (Id + A)−1.
Operator A is monotone if ∀(x, u),∀(y, v) ∈ graA, we have
〈x− y, u− v〉 ≥ 0. A is maximally monotone if graA is not
strictly contained in the graph of any other monotone operator.
A skew-symmetric matrix A = −AT defines a maximally
monotone operator Ax ( [28], p. 298). Suppose A and B are
maximally monotone operators and 0 ∈ int(domA−domB),
then A+B is also maximally monotone. For a proper lower
semi-continuous convex (l.s.c.) function f , its subdifferential
operator ∂f : domf → 2Rm is ∂f : x 7→ {g|f(y) ≥
f(x)+〈g, y−x〉,∀y ∈ domf}. ∂f is maximally monotone and
Proxf = R∂f : R
m → domf is called the proximal operator
of f , i.e., Proxf : x 7→ arg minu∈domf f(u) + 12 ||u− x||22.
Define the indicator function of Ω as ιΩ(x) = 0 if x ∈ Ω
and ιΩ(x) =∞ if x /∈ Ω. For a closed convex set Ω, ιΩ is a
proper l.s.c. function. ∂ιΩ is also the normal cone operator of
Ω, i.e., NΩ(x), where NΩ(x) = {v|〈v, y − x〉 ≤ 0,∀y ∈ Ω}
and domNΩ = Ω. Given a symmetric positive definite matrix
G, define PGΩ (x) = arg miny(ιΩ(y) +
1
2 ||x− y||2G).
For a single-valued operator T : Ω ⊂ Rm → Rm, x ∈ Ω
is a fixed point of T if Tx = x. T is nonexpansive if it is
1−Lipschitzian, i.e., ||T (x) − T (y)|| ≤ ||x − y||,∀x, y ∈ Ω.
T is contractive if ∃γ ∈ (0, 1) s.t. ||T (x) − T (y)|| ≤ γ||x −
y||,∀x, y ∈ Ω. Let α ∈ (0, 1), then T is α−averaged, denoted
as T ∈ A(α), if ∃ a nonexpansive operator T ′ such that T =
(1−α)Id+αT ′ . If T ∈ A( 12 ), T is called firmly nonexpansive.
III. GAME FORMULATION
Consider a set of players (agents) N = {1, · · · , N} that are
involved in the following noncooperative game with shared
coupling constraints. Player i ∈ N controls its own decision
(strategy or action) xi ∈ Ωi ⊂ Rni , where Ωi is its private fea-
sible set. Let x = col(x1, · · · , xN ) ∈ Rn denote the decision
profile, i.e., the stacked vector of all agents’ decisions, with∑N
i=1 ni = n. Let x−i = col(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN )
denote the decision profile of all agents except player i. Player
i aims to optimize its own objective function within its feasible
set, fi(xi,x−i) : Ω¯ → R where Ω¯ =
∏N
i=1 Ωi ⊂ Rn.
Note that fi(xi,x−i) is coupled with other players’ decisions
x−i. Moreover, all the players’ decisions are coupled together
through a globally shared set X ⊂ Rn. Hence, player i has
a set-valued map Xi(x−i) : Rn−ni → 2Rni that specifies its
feasible set defined as
Xi(x−i) := {xi ∈ Ωi|(xi,x−i) ∈ X}.
Given x−i, player i’s best-response strategy is
min
xi
fi(xi,x−i), s.t., xi ∈ Xi(x−i). (1)
A generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) x∗ = col(x∗1, · · · , x∗N )
is defined at the intersection of all players’ best-response sets,
x∗i ∈ arg min
xi
fi(xi,x
∗
−i), s.t., xi ∈ Xi(x∗−i), ∀i ∈ N . (2)
We consider the set X defined via two types of shared affine
coupling constraints, equality and inequality constraints. For
the equality constraint case, X = Xe where we denote
Xe :=
N∏
i=1
Ωi
⋂
{x ∈ Rn|
N∑
i=1
Aixi =
N∑
i=1
bi}. (3)
For the inequality constraint case, X = Xi where
Xi :=
N∏
i=1
Ωi
⋂
{x ∈ Rn|
N∑
i=1
Aixi ≤
N∑
i=1
bi}. (4)
In both (3) and (4), Ai ∈ Rm×ni and bi ∈ Rm as well as Ωi
are private data of player i. Thereby, the shared set X couples
all players’ feasible sets, but is not known by any agent. We
consider the following assumption on the game in (1).
Assumption 1: For player i, fi(xi,x−i) is a proper l.s.c.
function with respect to xi given any fixed x−i, and its
subdifferential with respect to xi is ∂ifi(xi,x−i). The pseudo-
subdifferential of the game in (1) defined as ∂F (x) : x →∏N
i=1 ∂ifi(xi,x−i) is maximally monotone. Ωi is a closed
convex set with nonempty interior. Xe in (3) has nonempty rel-
ative interiors, and Xi in (4) has nonempty interiors. Xi(x−i)
has nonempty relative interiors for x−i ∈
∏N
j=1,j 6=i Ωj when
X = Xe, and Xi(x−i) has nonempty interiors for x−i ∈∏N
j=1,j 6=i Ωj when X = X
i.
Remark 1: In many practical cases, fi(xi,x−i) has a split-
ting structure such as fi(xi,x−i) = gi(xi,x−i) + li(xi), [15],
where gi(xi,x−i) is differentiable and convex with respect
to xi, and li(xi) is a local l.s.c. regularization/cost term. De-
note ∇pG(x) = col(∇1g1(x1,x−1), · · · ,∇NgN (xN ,x−N ))
where ∇igi(xi,x−i) is the gradient of gi with respect to xi
and ∂L(x) : x → ∏Ni=1 ∂li(xi). Then ∂L(x) is maximally
monotone, since it is the subdifferential of
∑N
i=1 li(xi). In
this case, ∂F (x) = ∂L(x) +∇pG(x) is maximally monotone
when ∇pG(x) is monotone.
Define the generalized variational inequality (GVI) problem
Find x∗, s.t. 〈l∗,x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, l∗ ∈ ∂F (x∗),∀x ∈ X. (5)
According to Proposition 12.4 in [1], any solution of (5) is a
GNE of game in (1), called variational GNE.
Let us first analyze the equality constraint case, X = Xe.
Under Assumption 1, x∗ is a GNE of the game in (1) if and
only if ∀i ∈ N there exists λ∗i ∈ Rm such that,
0 ∈ ∂ifi(x∗i ,x∗−i) +ATi λ∗i +NΩi(x∗i ), ∀i ∈ N ,∑N
i=1Aix
∗
i =
∑N
i=1 bi.
(6)
Meanwhile, based on the Lagrangian duality for GVI (Equa-
tion (12.4) of [1]), x∗ is a solution of GVI in (5) with X = Xe
if and only if there exists a multiplier λ∗ ∈ Rm such that
0 ∈ ∂ifi(x∗i ,x∗−i) +ATi λ∗ +NΩi(x∗i ), ∀i ∈ N ,∑N
i=1Aix
∗
i =
∑N
i=1 bi.
(7)
By comparing the KKT conditions in (6) and (7), we have
that any solution to GVI in (5) with X = Xe is a GNE of the
game in (1) with all players having the same local multiplier.
Similarly, for the inequality case X = Xi, x∗ is a solution
of GVI (5) with X = Xi if and only if there exists a multiplier
λ∗ ∈ Rm+ such that
0 ∈ ∂ifi(x∗i ,x∗−i) +ATi λ∗ +NΩi(x∗i ), ∀i ∈ N ,
0 ∈ −∑Ni=1(Aix∗i − bi) +NRm+ (λ∗). (8)
Not every GNE of the considered game in (1) is a solution
to the GVI in (5). Since the variational GNE has an economic
interpretation of no price discrimination and enjoys a stability
and sensitivity property (refer to [1]), we aim to propose novel
distributed algorithms for computing a variational GNE of the
monotone game for X = Xe and X = Xi, respectively.
Assumption 2: The solution set of GVI in (5) is nonempty for
both X = Xe and X = Xi, or equivalently, the considered
game in (1) has at least a variational GNE.
Remark 2: Some sufficient conditions for the existence of
solutions to monotone GVI can be found in [1] and [15]. For
example, compactness of Ωi,∀i ∈ N ensures Assumption 2.
IV. DISTRIBUTED GNE COMPUTATION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we propose distributed algorithms that
players can use to find a solution of GVI (5) for X = Xe
and X = Xi, respectively. We focus on distributed variational
GNE computation because of two reasons. Firstly, player i can
only manipulate its local fi(xi,x−i), Ai, bi and Ωi for local
computation, since these contain its private information. Sec-
ondly, we assume there is no central node that has bidirectional
communications with all players, either because this could be
inefficient from a communication point of view, or because
it might be not possible to have such a central node. Thus,
each player only uses its local data for local computation, and
has peer-to-peer communication with its neighbours for local
coordination.
We first introduce the communication graph and algorithm
notations in IV-A. We give the proximal ADMM for equality
constraint case in IV-B, and the distributed algorithm for
inequality constraint case in IV-C.
A. Communication graph and algorithm variables
To facilitate the distributed coordination, players are able to
communicate with their neighbours through a connected and
undirected graph G = (N , E). The edge set is E ⊂ N × N ,
(i, j) ∈ E if agent i and agent j can share information with
each other, and agents j, i are called neighbours. A path of
graph G is a sequence of distinct agents in N such that any
consecutive agents in the sequence are neighbours. Agent j is
said to be connected to agent i if there is a path from j to i.
G is connected if any two agents are connected.
Obviously, |N | = N , and we denote |E| = M . The edges
are labeled with el, l = 1, · · · ,M . Without loss of generality,
el = (i, j) is arbitrarily ordered and denoted by i→ j. Define
E ini and Eouti for agent i as follows: el ∈ E ini if agent i is the
targeted point of el; el ∈ Eouti if agent i is the starting point
of el. Then denote Ei = E ini
⋃ Eouti as the set of edges adjoint
to agent i. Define the incidence matrix of G as V ∈ RN×M
with Vil = 1 if el ∈ E ini , and Vil = −1 if el ∈ Eouti , otherwise
Vil = 0. We have 1TNV = 0
T
M , and V
Tx = 0M if and only if
x ∈ {α1N |α ∈ R} when G is connected. Denote Nl = {i, j}
as the pair of agents connected by edge el = (i, j).
We introduce the variables. Firstly, each player has a local
decision xi ∈ Ωi and a local multiplier λi ∈ Rm. According
to KKT (7) and (8), in steady-state all players should have
the same local multiplier, i.e., λi = λ∗,∀i ∈ N . To facilitate
the coordination for the consensus of local multipliers and
to ensure the coupling constraint, we consider an auxiliary
variable zl ∈ Rm associated with edge el of graph G. Notice
that G is undirected and the edges are arbitrarily ordered,
therefore, we can have any agent from Nl to maintain zl.
For clarity, we let the starting agent of an edge to maintain
the corresponding edge variable. That is agent i will take the
responsibility for maintaining zl if el ∈ Eouti .
Before presenting the algorithms we first make some obser-
vations. The algorithms are based on decomposing the GNE
computation into sequential NE computation for regularized
subgames and distributed update of local multipliers and aux-
iliary variables. The regularized subgames are made to have
strongly monotone PS with the help of proximal terms, hence
can be efficiently solved by existing distributed algorithms,
such as the best-response algorithm in [2]. The update of the
local multipliers has to be done so that in steady-state they
are the same, and satisfy the optimality conditions (7), (8)
involving the constraints, while using only local information.
Towards this we use the auxiliary variables zl, which have a
double role: to help in estimating the contribution of the other
players’ in the constraints and to enforce consensus.
Let xi,k, λi,k and zl,k denote xi, λi and zl at iteration k.
B. Proximal ADMM for X = Xe
The distributed algorithm for computing a variational GNE
of game in (1) when X = Xe is given as follows.
Algorithm 1:
Step 1–update of xi,k:
• Player i receives zl,k, l ∈ E ini through G.
• Construct a subgame where player i has a decision xi ∈
Ωi and an objective function f˜i(xi,x−i),
f˜i(xi,x−i) = fi(xi,x−i) +
1
2
||xi − xi,k||2Ri
+ [λi,k +Hi(Aixi,k +
∑
l∈Ei
Vilzl,k − bi)]TAixi. (9)
and denote its NE by xˆk = col(xˆ1,k, · · · , xˆN,k).
• Players compute x˜k = col(x˜1,k, · · · , x˜N,k) as an inexact
solution to subgame (9) such that ||x˜k−xˆk|| ≤ µk, where
µk is described below.
• Player i updates its local decision xi,k with
xi,k+1 = xi,k + ρ(x˜i,k − xi,k). (10)
Step 2–update of λi,k:
λi,k+1 = λi,k + ρHi(Aix˜i,k +
∑
l∈Ei
Vilzl,k − bi). (11)
Step 3–update of zl,k:
Let si,k = 1ρλi,k+1+
ρ−1
ρ λi,k+Hi(Aix˜i,k+
∑
l∈Ei Vilzl,k−
bi). For el ∈ Eouti , player i receives sj,k, j ∈ Nl \ {i}, and
updates zl,k with
zl,k+1 = zl,k − ρWl(sj,k − si,k). (12)
{µk} is a nonnegative sequence s.t.
∑∞
k=1 µk <∞, ρ ∈ [1, 2)
is a fixed relaxation/extrapolation step-size, and Ri ∈ Rni×ni ,
Hi ∈ Rm×m and Wl ∈ Rm×m, l ∈ Eouti are local parameters
(step-sizes) that are symmetric positive definite matrices.
We give next some intuition behind Algorithm 1’s design.
Since Ai, bi are private data, the coupling constraint X = Xe
is not completely known by any player. Note that in steady-
state we should have Aix∗i − bi =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i(Ajx
∗
j − bj)
due to (7), where the right-hand side is unknown information
for player i. The penalized cost f˜i in (9) is composed of a
proximal term fi(xi, x−i) + 12 ||xi − xi,k||2Ri (to regularize
the subgames), a Lagrangian term 〈λi, Aixi〉 and a penalty
term. The penalty term is based on linearizing the quadratic
penalty 12 ||Aixi − bi +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i(Ajxj,k − bj)||2Hi at xi,k,
which should be zero in steady-state cf. (7). This gives
〈Hi(Aixi,k +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i(Ajxj,k − bj)− bi), Aixi〉 after drop-
ping all constants. To overcome the need for information
about the other players j 6= i, in (9) this term is estimated
as (Hi[Aixi,k +
∑
l∈Ei Vilzl,k − bi])TAixi, via the auxiliary
variables zl. A similar term is used in the local multiplier
λi’s update, (11). Player i uses Aix˜i,k +
∑
l∈Ei Vilzl,k − bi
as an estimation of
∑N
j=1(Ajxj,k − bj) to update its λi. The
update for zl, (12), has an integrator dynamics form driven
by the difference between λi and λj , since el = (i, j), and
ensures the consensus of local multipliers. Meanwhile, (11)
also utilizes zl,k, that is the integrator for differences between
multipliers, as the feedback signal to reach consensus of local
multipliers.
We show in Theorem 1 that at the limit point of the algo-
rithm Aix∗i − bi =
∑
l∈Ei Vilz
∗
l ,∀i ∈ N , while Aix∗i − bi =∑N
j=1,j 6=i(Ajx
∗
j − bj) due to (7). Hence,
∑
l∈Ei Vilz
∗
l , gener-
ated as an output of (12) is an estimation of
∑N
j=1,j 6=i(Ajx
∗
j−
bj), and
∑
l∈Ei Vilzl,k as used by player i is a dynamical
estimator for
∑N
j=1,j 6=i(Ajxj,k − bj). Motivated by [29], the
auxiliary variable zl has an interpretation of network flow. In
fact, if we regard Aixi as in-flow at node i and bi as out-flow
at node i, and
∑N
i=1Aixi =
∑N
i=1 bi is a conservative network
flow balancing constraint. Thereby, zl can be regarded as flow
on each edge to ensure the balancing constraint. All in all,
variables zl estimate the other players’ contribution to coupling
constraints, and ensure local multipliers reach consensus.
Algorithm 1 updates each coordinate with the most recent
information in a Gauss-Seidel manner and uses proximal
terms, hence is called proximal ADMM. It uses relaxation
steps, ρ ∈ [1, 2), to perform extrapolations of all variables,
which in practice could accelerate convergence (refer to Figure
2 of [30] and numerical studies in [26], [27]). It is a center-
free distributed algorithm with peer-to-peer communications.
In Step 1, player i communicates with its neighbours to
get zl,k, l ∈ E ini . The NE of subgames can be computed in
a distributed manner with existing algorithms such as best-
response algorithms in [2] and gradient algorithms in [16],
[20] and [21], which only involve local computations and
communications. In Step 2, player i uses its x˜i,k and locally
available zl,k, l ∈ Ei to update its local multiplier λi. In Step 3,
player i computes si,k with its local information, and receives
sj,k, j ∈ Nl \ {i} to update zl,k.
Next, we put Algorithm 1 in a compact form and show that
its limiting point x∗ is a variational GNE of game in (1) when
X = Xe. We use the following compact notations. Denote
λ¯ = col(λ1, · · · , λN ) and Z = col(z1, · · · , zM ). Denote
R = diag{R1, · · · , RN}, W = diag{W1, · · · ,WM}, H =
diag{H1, · · · , HN}, V¯ = V ⊗ Im, Λ = diag{A1, · · · , AN},
and b¯ = col(b1, · · · , bN ).
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 and 2 hold for game
(1) when X = Xe. Then any limiting point col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) of
Algorithm 1 belongs to the zeros of operator Me defined by
Me :
 xZ
λ¯
 7→
 ΛT λ¯+ (NΩ¯ + ∂F )xV¯ T λ¯
−Λx− V¯ Z+ b¯
 (13)
Meanwhile, any zero col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) of Me (13) has the x∗
component as a variational GNE of game (1) when X = Xe.
Proof: We write Algorithm 1 in a compact form. Due to prox-
imal terms 12 ||xi − xi,k||2Ri and Assumption 1, the subgame
in Step 1 has a strongly monotone pseudo-subdifferential,
hence its NE xˆk exists and is also unique. Therefore, xˆi,k =
arg minxi∈Ωi f˜i(xi, xˆ−i,k), and its KKT condition is
0 ∈ NΩi(xˆi,k) + ∂ifi(xˆi,k, xˆ−i,k) +Ri(xˆi,k − xi,k)
+ATi [λi,k +Hi(Aixi,k +
∑
l∈Ei Vilzl,k − bi)].
Concatenating all KKT conditions together and using the
compact notations defined before, yields for xˆk
0 ∈ NΩ¯(xˆk) + ∂F (xˆk) +R(xˆk − xk)
+ΛT [λ¯k +H(Λxk + V¯ Zk − b¯)]. (14)
We also have ||x˜k − xˆk|| ≤ µk and xk+1 = xk + ρ(x˜k −xk).
Let λ˜i,k = λi,k+Hi(Aix˜i,k+
∑
l∈Ei Vilzl,k−bi) and
¯˜
λk =
col(λ˜1,k, · · · , λ˜N,k). The compact form of Step 2 is
¯˜
λk = λ¯k +H(Λx˜k + V¯ Zk − b¯),
λ¯k+1 = λ¯k + ρ(
¯˜
λk − λ¯k).
(15)
Noticing that 1ρλi,k+1 +
ρ−1
ρ λi,k = λ˜i,k, we have si,k =
λ˜i,k + Hi(Aix˜i,k +
∑
l∈Ei Vilzl,k − bi). Denote s¯k =
col(s1,k, · · · , sN,k), then s¯k = ˜¯λ+H(Λx˜k+V¯ Zk−b¯). Denote
z˜l,k = zl,k − Wi[sj,k − si,k], el = i → j, then zl,k+1 =
zl,k + ρ(z˜l,k − zl,k). Denote Z˜k = col(z˜1,k, · · · , z˜M,k), then
Z˜k = Zk −WV¯ T s¯k. The updates zl,k are in compact form
Z˜k = Zk −WV¯ T [˜¯λ+H(Λx˜k + V¯ Zk − b¯)],
Zk+1 = Zk + ρ(Z˜k − Zk).
(16)
Using (14), (15), (16), Algorithm 1 is written compactly as
Rxk − ΛT [λ¯k +H(Λxk + V¯ Zk − b¯)] ∈ (NΩ¯ + ∂F +R)(xˆk)
||x˜k − xˆk|| ≤ µk
˜¯λk = λ¯k +H(Λx˜k + V¯ Zk − b¯)
Z˜k = Zk −WV¯ T (˜¯λk +H(Λx˜k + V¯ Zk − b¯)
xk+1 = xk + ρ(x˜k − xk), λ¯k+1 = λ¯k + ρ(˜¯λk − λ¯k)
Zk+1 = Zk + ρ(Z˜k − Zk)
(17)
We verify next that any limiting point of Algorithm 1, or
(17), is a zero of operator Me, (13). Since {µk} satisfies∑∞
k=1 µk < ∞ and µk ≥ 0, we have µk → 0 as k → ∞.
Assume (17) has a limiting point col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗), then we have
xk+1 = xk = x˜k = xˆk = x
∗, λ¯k+1 = λ¯k = ˜¯λk = λ¯∗, and
Zk+1 = Zk = Z˜k = Z
∗. By (17), col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) satisfies
− ΛT [λ¯∗ +H(Λx∗ + V¯ Z∗ − b¯)] ∈ (NΩ¯ + ∂F )(x∗) (18)
λ¯∗ = λ¯∗ +H(Λx∗ + V¯ Z∗ − b¯) (19)
Z∗ = Z∗ −WV¯ T (λ¯∗ +H(Λx∗ + V¯ Z∗ − b¯) (20)
Since H , R and W are symmetric positive definite, (19)
implies that 0 = Λx∗ + V¯ Z∗ − b¯, i.e., Aix∗i − bi =∑
l∈Ei Vilz
∗
l ,∀i ∈ N . Then (18) and (20) imply 0 ∈ ΛT λ¯∗ +
(NΩ¯+∂F )(x
∗) and 0 = V¯ T λ¯∗. Using (13) for operator Me, it
follows that any limit point of Algorithm 1 belongs to zerMe.
We show that any col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) ∈ zerMe has x∗ as
a variational GNE of game (1). Since G is undirected and
connected, V¯ T λ¯∗ = 0 implies λ¯∗ = 1N⊗λ∗, λ∗ ∈ Rm. Using
1TNV = 0
T
M and −Λx∗ − V¯ Z∗ + b¯ = 0, 1TN ⊗ Im(−Λx∗ −
V ⊗ImZ∗+ b¯) = 0 implies
∑N
i=1Aix
∗
i =
∑N
i=1 bi. Moreover,
0 ∈ ΛT λ¯∗ + (NΩ¯ + ∂F )(x∗) and λ¯∗ = 1N ⊗ λ∗ imply
0 ∈ ATi λ∗+NΩi(x∗i )+∂ifi(x∗i ,x∗−i), ∀i ∈ N . Therefore, x∗
and λ∗ satisfy the KKT condition (7) for the GVI (5), hence,
x∗ is a variational GNE of game (1) with X = Xe. , and all
players have the same local multipliers, i.e., λ∗i = λ
∗,∀i ∈ N .
2
C. Proximal parallel splitting algorithm for X = Xi
The distributed variational GNE computation algorithm for
game (1) when X = Xi is given as follows.
Algorithm 2:
Step 1a–update of xi,k:
• Construct a subgame where player i has a decision xi ∈
Ωi and an objective function f˜i(xi,x−i),
f˜i(xi,x−i) = fi(xi,x−i) +
1
2
||xi − xi,k||2Ri + λTi,kAixi,
(21)
and denote its NE by xˆk = col(xˆ1,k, · · · , xˆN,k).
• Compute an inexact solution x˜k = col(x˜1,k, · · · , x˜N,k)
to game in (21) such that ||x˜k − xˆk|| ≤ µk.
• Player i updates its decision xi,k with
xi,k+1 = xi,k + ρ(x˜i,k − xi,k). (22)
Step 1b–update of zl,k: If el ∈ Eouti , then player i receives
λj,k, j ∈ Nl \ {i}, and updates zl,k with
z˜l,k = zl,k −Wl(λj,k − λi,k),
zl,k+1 = zl,k + ρ(z˜l,k − zl,k). (23)
Step 2–update of λi,k: player i receives z˜l,k, zl,k, el ∈ E ini .
λ˜i,k = P
H−1i
Rm+
[λi,k +Hi(Ai(2x˜i,k − xi,k)
+
∑
l∈Ei Vil(2z˜l,k − zl,k)− bi)],
λi,k+1 = λi,k + ρ(λ˜i,k − λi,k).
(24)
All variables have the same meaning as in Algorithm 1.
Remark 3: Compared with Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 has
a different update order, that is
{
x
Z
→ λ¯ rather than
x → λ¯ → Z. Algorithm 2 is called a proximal parallel
splitting algorithm since x and Z can be updated in parallel,
and only the update of λ utilizes the most recent information.
Another difference lies in the construction of subgame at Step
1a, i.e., (21) only utilizes the proximal term and Lagrangian
term without considering a (linearized) quadratic penalty term.
The quadratic term in proximal ADMM is motivated by
the augmented Lagrangian method for equality constrained
optimization. However, the augmented Lagrangian method
for inequality constrained optimization is less understood
and may involve non-differentiable terms. Hence, augmented
Lagrangian methods for distributed GNE computation of in-
equality constrained games is beyond the scope of this paper.
Using the same compact notations in subsection IV-B, such
as λ¯, Z, R, W , H , V¯ , Λ, ΛT , and b¯, we give next the limiting
point analysis of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumption 1, 2 hold for the game
(1) when X = Xi. Then any limiting point col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) of
Algorithm 2 belongs to the zeros of operator Mi defined by
Mi :
 xZ
λ¯
 7→
 ΛT λ¯+ (NΩ¯ + ∂F )xV¯ T λ¯
−Λx− V¯ Z+ b¯+NRmN+ (λ¯)
 (25)
Meanwhile, any zero col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) of Mi, (25) has the x∗
component as a variational GNE of game in (1) when X = Xi.
Proof: We first write Algorithm 2 in a compact form. Since
xˆk is an NE of subgame (21), xˆi,k is an optimal solution to
minxi∈Ωi fi(xi, xˆ−i,k) +
1
2 ||xi − xi,k||2Ri + λTi,kAixi. Under
Assumption 1 and 2, its optimality condition is
0 ∈ NΩi(xˆi,k)+∂ifi(xˆi,k, xˆ−i,k)+Ri(xˆi,k−xi,k)+ATi λi,k.
On the other hand, x˜ = PGΩ (x) = arg miny(ιΩ(y) +
1
2 ||x −
y||2G) if and only if 0 ∈ NΩ(x˜)+G(x˜−x). Therefore, the first
line of (24) can be written as 0 ∈ NRm+ (λ˜i,k) +H−1i {λ˜i,k −
λi,k − Hi[Ai(2x˜i,k − xi,k) +
∑
l∈Ei Vil(2z˜l,k − zl,k) − bi]}.
Hence, for all players we can write in compact form,
0 ∈ (NΩ¯ + ∂F )(xˆk) +R(xk − xˆk) + ΛT λ¯k,
||x˜k − xˆk|| ≤ µk, xk+1 = xk + ρ(x˜k − xk)
Z˜k = Zk −WV¯ T λ¯k, Zk+1 = Zk + ρ(Z˜k − Zk),
0 ∈ NRmN+ (
˜¯λk) +H
−1{˜¯λk − λ¯k
−H[Λ(2x˜k − x) + V¯ (2Z˜k − Zk)− b¯)]
}
λ¯k+1 = λ¯k + ρ(
˜¯λk − λ¯k)
(26)
Since R,H,W are positive definite, with similar arguments
in Theorem 1, it can be verified that any limiting point of (26)
is a zero of Mi in (25).
Suppose col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) is a zero of Mi in (25). Then with
similar arguments as in Theorem 1, we obtain λ¯∗ to be 1N ⊗
λ∗, λ∗ ∈ Rm. And x∗ together with λ∗ satisfies the first line of
(8). Moreover, by 0 ∈ −Λx∗−V¯ Z∗+b¯+NRmN+ (λ¯∗) and λ¯∗ =
1N ⊗ λ∗, there exist v1, v2, · · · , vN ∈ NRm+ (λ∗), such that
0mN = −Λx∗−V ⊗ImZ∗+ b¯+col(v1, · · · , vN ). Multiplying
both sides of above equation with 1TN⊗Im and combining with
1TV = 0T , we have 0m = −
∑N
i=1(Aix
∗
i − bi) +
∑N
i=1 vi
We have
∑N
i=1 vi ∈ NRm+ (λ∗) due to vi ∈ NRm+ (λ∗) and
NRm+ (λ
∗) is a convex cone. This implies that the second line
of KKT condition (8) is satisfied. The conclusion follows. 2
Remark 4: Both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are double-
layer algorithms since at each outer-layer iteration, players
need to compute inexactly an NE of regularized subgames
with a given accuracy. Since only monotonicity is assumed
here, various problems could be solved with our algorithms,
but the specified choice of the inner-layer algorithm should be
determined according to the problem at hand. Thus, Algorithm
1 and Algorithm 2 are “prototype” algorithms. The inner-
layer NE seeking algorithm is not specified for the following
reasons.
• The NE seeking algorithm can and should be tailored
according to the structure of the objective functions,
such as the splitting form in Remark 1. For example, if
∂F (x) = ∂L(x) +∇pG(x) as in Remark 1, the possible
Lipschitz continuity of ∇pG(x) should be considered
when choosing the NE algorithm.
• The subgames are regularized to have strongly monotone
PS/PGs due to the proximal term 12 ||xi − xi,k||2Ri , hence
efficient NE seeking algorithms available in the literature
can be used, e.g., [2], [4], [14], [18], [20].
For example, if the objective functions satisfy the assumptions
in [2], the asynchronous distributed best-response algorithm
in [2] could be adopted for NE seeking. Particularly, denote
B(x) = col(B1(x−1), · · · ,BN (x−N )) where Bi(x−i) =
arg minxi∈Ωi f˜i(xi,x−i) given fixed x−i. Using Lemma 14
of [2], Ri can be chosen such that B(x) is a contractive
map, hence the best-response algorithm enjoys a geometric
convergence rate. This is even more preferable if B(x) has
a closed form. If it does not, since f˜i(xi,x−i) is strongly
convex in xi given x−i due to 12 ||xi − xi,k||2Ri , Bi(x−i) can
be computed locally with the proximal gradient method that
also enjoys a geometric convergence rate.
The stopping criterion for the inner layer should be decided
after the NE seeking algorithm is selected. For example, for the
best-response algorithm in [2] a termination criterion to meet
a given solution accuracy can be determined as in Remark 18
of [2].
We note that a single-layer GNE seeking algorithm has
been proposed in [15], but uses diminishing step-sizes and
a coordination center. Our double-layer GNE algorithm could
be preferable when there is no central node and the subgames
can be easily solved.
Remark 5: The challenges involved in GNE seeking of game
(1) are as follows. Firstly, the game has monotone PS without
Lipschitz continuity (or the Lipschitz constant is not known
prior). Secondly, the players can only communicate peer-to-
peer to coordinate to ensure coupling constraints, even though
neither Xe nor Xi is available to any agent. The key idea
of the proposed algorithms, i.e., Algorithm 1 and 2, is to
decompose the complicated GNE seeking into sequential NE
computation of regularized subgames and local coordinations.
Notice that double-layer algorithms have been adopted for
GNE seeking in [3] and [9], but only for strongly monotone
games. The proximal terms regularize the subgame such that
its NE can be much easier computed. The edge variables,
motivated by network flow, [29], are introduced to assist agents
to reach consensus on local multipliers and to satisfy the
coupling constraints.
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first show that both Algorithm 1 and 2
can be derived from a preconditioned proximal point algorithm
(PPPA) for finding zeros of monotone operators. Then, based
on this relationship we prove their convergence under a suffi-
cient choice for the parameters Ri, Hi and Wl, ∀i ∈ N , l ∈ E .
Given a maximally monotone operator M and a symmetric
positive definite matrix Φ, the inexact PPPA with relaxation
steps for finding a zero of M is given below.
Algorithm 3:
Φ($k − $ˆk) ∈M$ˆk, ||$ˆk − $˜k|| ≤ νk,
$k+1 = $k + ρ($˜k −$k), (27)
where νk > 0,
∑∞
k=1 νk < ∞, and ρ ∈ [1, 2).
Remark 6: The proximal algorithm for solving 0 ∈ M(x)
(referring to Theorem 23.41 of [28]) is
$k+1 = RM$k = (Id +M)
−1$k. (28)
which can be equivalently written as $k −$k+1 ∈M$k+1.
Intuitively speaking, when M($) is a linear operator M$,
each iteration of (28) involves computing an inverse of I+M.
Hence, compared with (28), Algorithm 3 introduces a precon-
ditioning matrix Φ, considers the inexactness when evaluating
the resolvent of M at some specified point, and adopts an
extrapolation/relexation step.
Particularly, the preconditioning matrix Φ plays a crucial
role in our algorithm design:
• It adds a proximal term 12 ||xi − xi,k||2Ri to (9) and (21)
that regularizes the subgames.
• It helps to compute the resolvent of the linear parts of
Me and Mi with just one step of local communication
and local computation, without any matrix inverse.
The next result shows the convergence of Algorithm 3.
Theorem 3: Suppose M is maximally monotone, and Φ
is symmetric positive definite. Suppose $k is generated by
PPPA Algorithm 3 with
∑∞
k=1 νk < ∞, ρ ∈ [1, 2). Then $k
converges to $∗ and $∗ ∈ zerM.
The proof of Theorem 3 is adapted from [30], and can be
found in the Appendix.
In the next two subsections, we show the convergence of
Algorithm 1 and 2 by relating them to PPPA Algorithm 3, for
appropriately chosen monotone operators and preconditioning
matrices, and by using Theorem 3.
A. Convergence analysis for X = Xe
We introduce two auxiliary variables η ∈ RmN and
θ ∈ RmN and denote $ = col(x, η,Z, θ). Consider another
operator M¯e related to Me in (13), defined as M¯e : $ 7→
0 ΛT 0 −ΛT
−Λ 0 −V¯ 0
0 V¯ T 0 −V¯ T
Λ 0 V¯ 0
$ +

(NΩ¯ + ∂F )x
b¯
0
−b¯
 .
(29)
Define a preconditioning matrix Φe,
Φe =

R −ΛT 0 ΛT
−Λ 2H−1 V¯ 0
0 V¯ T W−1 V¯ T
Λ 0 V¯ 2H−1
 (30)
where W = diag{W1, · · · ,WM}, H = diag{H1, · · · , HN}.
The following result relates Algorithm 1 to the PPPA
Algorithm 3 for M = M¯e and Φ = Φe.
Theorem 4: Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Denote
col(xk,Zk, λ¯k), xˆk and col(x˜k, Z˜k, ˜¯λk) as points gener-
ated by Algorithm 1 for initial points x0,Z0, λ¯0. Denote
$k = col(x
′
k, ηk,Z
′
k, θk), $ˆk = col(xˆ
′
k, ηˆk, Zˆ
′
k, θˆk), and
$˜k = col(x˜
′
k, η˜k, Z˜
′
k, θ˜k) as the points generated by the PPPA
Algorithm 3 with M = M¯e and Φ = Φe for initial points
x
′
0 = x0, η0 = λ¯0 + H(Λx0 + V¯
T λ¯0 − b¯),Z′0 = Z0, θ0 = 0.
Then, any sequence col(xk,Zk, λ¯k) can be derived from some
sequence $k = col(x
′
k, ηk,Z
′
k, θk) as follows
xk = x
′
k, Zk = Z
′
k,
λ¯k = ηk − θk −H(Λx′k + V¯ Z
′
k − b¯),
(31)
for some nonnegative sequence {νk} such that
∑∞
k=1 νk <∞.
The proof of Theorem 4 is based on an induction argument
and is given in the Appendix.
Remark 7: The standard ADMM for optimization can be
derived from the Douglas-Rachford (DS) splitting method
for dual optimization problems, and analyzed as a proximal-
point algorithm, see [30] and [28]. For proximal ADMM, the
analysis in [26] shows that the posterior second coordinate is
not available when updating the first one. That is the reason
why we split λ¯ into η and θ, to have a higher order dynamics.
The preconditioned DS splitting method recently introduced
in [31], might lead to proximal ADMM. Compared to [31],
our algorithm applies relaxation steps to all coordinates and
considers inexactness in solving the subproblems.
We prove the convergence of Algorithm 1, by exploiting the
relationship given in Theorem 4 and using Theorem 3.
Theorem 5: Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold for game
(1) when X = Xe, and parameters (step-sizes) Ri, Hi,Wl are
symmetric positive definite, chosen such that R−ΛTHΛ and
W−1−V¯ THV¯ are positive definite. Then, any col(xk,Zk, λ¯k)
generated by Algorithm 1 converges to col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) ∈
zerMe. Furthermore, x∗ is a variational GNE of game in (1)
when X = Xe, and λ¯∗ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, λ∗ ∈ Rm.
Proof: By Theorem 4, Algorithm 1 is related to PPPA Al-
gorithm 3 for M¯e, (29), Φe, (30). Convergence follows by
Theorem 3 if we show that M¯e is maximally monotone and
Φe is positive definite. Denote $ = col(x, η,Z, θ), then
$TΦe$ = xTRx− 2xTΛT η + 2xTΛT θ + 2ηH−1η
+2ηT V¯ Z+ ZTW−1Z+ 2ZT V¯ T θ + 2θTH−1θ
= ||HΛx+ θ − η||2H−1 + ||HV¯ Z+ θ + η||2H−1
+||x||2R−ΛTHΛ + ||Z||2W−1−V¯ THV¯
Since R − ΛTHΛ and W−1 − V¯ THV¯ are positive definite,
it follows immediately that Φe is positive definite.
Operator M¯e, (29), is written as the sum of two opera-
tors. The first is a skew-symmetric linear operator, hence,
is maximally monotone with domain of whole space. NΩ¯
is maximally monotone as a normal cone operator of a
closed convex set, and ∂F (x) is also maximally monotone
by Assumption 1. Since their domains coincide, NΩ¯ + ∂F is
maximally monotone, and the 2nd term in (29) is maximally
monotone as the Cartesian product of maximally monotone
operators.
By Theorem 4, for any sequence col(xk,Zk, λ¯k) generated
from Algorithm 1, we can find $k = col(x
′
k, ηk,Z
′
k, θk)
generated from Algorithm 3 such that (31) holds for all
k and
∑∞
k=1 νk < ∞. By Theorem 3, $k converges to
$∗ = col(x
′∗, η∗,Z
′∗, θ∗) and $∗ ∈ zerM¯e. By (31),
col(xk,Zk, λ¯k) also converges to col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) such that
x∗ = x
′∗, Z∗ = Z
′∗, and λ¯∗ = η∗−θ∗−H(Λx′∗+V¯ Z′∗− b¯).
Since $∗ = col(x
′∗, η∗,Z
′∗, θ∗) is a zero of M¯e, (29), we
have Λx
′∗ + V¯ Z
′∗ − b¯ = 0, so that λ¯∗ = η∗ − θ∗, and
0 ∈ ΛT (η∗ − θ∗) + (NΩ¯ + ∂F )x
′∗, 0 ∈ V¯ T (η∗ − θ∗).
Using x
′∗ = x∗, Z
′∗ = Z∗ and the definition of Me in (13),
it follows that col(xk,Zk, λ¯k) generated from Algorithm 1
converges to col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) ∈ zerMe. By Theorem 1, xk
converges to x∗, a variational GNE of the game in (1), and
players’ local multipliers converge to the same λ∗, which
together with x∗ satisfies KKT condition in (7). 2
Remark 8: If Hi is chosen to be a diagonal positive matrix,
Ri and Wl can be chosen using diagonally dominance to
ensure R− ΛTHΛ and W−1 − V¯ THV¯ are positive definite.
In this case, the parameters Ri, Hi and Wl can be chosen
independently by player i with just local data and computation.
B. Convergence analysis for X = Xi
The next result shows the convergence of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 6: Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold for game
(1) when X = Xi, and parameters Ri, Hi,Wl are symmetric
positive definite, such that the matrix Φi is positive definite,
Φi =
 R 0 −ΛT0 W−1 −V T
−Λ −V H−1
 (32)
Then any col(xk,Zk, λ¯k) generated by Algorithm 2 converges
to col(x∗,Z∗, λ¯∗) ∈ zerMi in (25). Furthermore, x∗ is a
variational GNE of game in (1) and λ¯∗ = 1N ⊗λ∗, λ∗ ∈ Rm+ .
Proof: Consider the PPPA Algorithm 3 with $ =
col(x,Z, λ¯), for Φ = Φi and M = Mi and νk = µk.
After manipulations, the PPPA algorithm gives (26). Hence,
Algorithm 2 can be derived from Algorithm 3 via a one-to-
one correspondence relation. Notice that Mi in (25) can be
written as the sum of a skew-symmetric linear operator and a
product of (NΩ¯ + ∂F )x× 0×NRmN+ (λ¯). Under Assumption
1 and 2, with similar arguments as in Theorem 5, we can
show that Mi in (25) is maximally monotone. Since Φi is
symmetric positive definite, by Theorem 3, PPPA Algorithm
3 converges. Therefore, Algorithm 2 converges to a zero of
Mi, and the conclusion follows by invoking Theorem 2. 2
Remark 9: Our recent work [24] considers GNE computa-
tion for games with inequality affine constraints, but assumes a
strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous PG, with inertial
steps for possible acceleration. In this paper, we only assume
a monotone PS, consider the inexactness when solving sub-
problems, and use relaxation steps for possible acceleration.
Moreover, as seen in the convergence analysis, both Algorithm
1 and 2 can be regarded as fixed-point iterations for averaged
operators, hence the convergence rate for fixed-point residuals
could be derived based on an analysis as in [32].
VI. APPLICATION AND SIMULATION STUDIES
A. Rate control game over wireless ad-hoc networks
This example is adapted from [21]. Consider a wire-
less ad-hoc network (WANET) with 16 nodes and 16 links
Fig. 1. (a): Wireless Ad-Hoc Network. (b): Communication graph.
Fig. 2. The trajectories of selected users’ data rate xi,k , which show the
convergence of Algorithm 2.
{L1, · · · , L16} as shown in Fig. 1. There are 15 users
{U1, ..., U15} who want to transfer data through the links. Ri is
the path adopted by user Ui, and Lj ∈ Ri if user Ui transfers
data through link Lj . User Ui decides its data rate xi, and
should satisfy a local constraint 0 ≤ xi ≤ Bi. In Fig. 1, the
solid lines represent the links {L1, · · · , L16}, and dashed line
displays each path Ri. Denote A = [A1, · · · , A15] ∈ R16×15
where Ai ∈ R16, and Ai has its jth element to be 1 if Ui uses
Lj and to be 0, otherwise. Link Lj has a maximal capacity
Cj > 0. Denote C = col(C1, · · · , C16), hence all users’
data rate x should satisfy the inequality coupling constraint
Ax ≤ C. The objective function of user Ui is fi(xi,x−i) =
−ui(xi)+DT (x)Aixi, where ui(xi) = χi log(xi+1) is user
i’s utility function, and D(x) = col(d1(x), · · · , d16(x)) with
dj(x) =
κj
Cj−[Ax]j+ξj maps x to the unit delays of each link.
The parameters are randomly drawn as follows: Cj ∈ [10, 15],
Bi ∈ [5, 10], χi ∈ [10, 20], κj ∈ [10, 30] and ξj ∈ [20, 40],
and are numerically verified to ensure Assumption 1.
We use Algorithm 2. Each player has a local Ci = 115C, and
has local step-sizes Ri = 10, Hi = 0.5I16, Wl = 0.5I16 and
ρ = 1.1. Players communicate over the graph in Fig. 1, with
edges arbitrarily ordered. The initial point xi,0 is randomly
chosen within [0, Bi], and initial λi, zl are chosen to be zero.
The subgames are solved using gradient methods in [20] to
get the exact NE xˆk, and each x˜k is chosen as the first point
satisfying ||x˜k − xˆk|| < 1k2 . The simulation results are shown
in Fig. 2-4.
Fig. 3. (a): The trajectories of local multiplier λ1,k of player 1. (b): The
trajectories of selected users’ estimations of the third component of λ∗. It
shows that all the players find the same multiplier λ∗.
Fig. 4. (a) The trajectories of violations of the coupling constraint Ax−C.
(b)λ¯j is the averaging of the jth component of all players’ local multipliers.
It shows that the coupling constraint is asymptotically satisfied, and the
complementary condition λ∗⊥Ax∗ − C is asymptotically satisfied.
B. Task allocation game
In this part, we consider a task allocation game with 8 tasks
{T1, · · · , T8} and 14 processors (workers) {w1, · · · , w14}.
Each task Tj is quantified as a load of Cj > 0 that
should be met by the workers. Each worker wi decides its
working output xi = col(x1i , x
2
i , x
3
i , x
4
i ) ∈ R4 within its
capacity 0 ≤ xi ≤ Bi, Bi ∈ R4+. If worker wi allocates
a part of its output to task Tj , there is an arrow wi → Tj
in Fig. 5, either blue or red. Specifically, if wi allocates
x1i , x
2
i to Tj , there is a dashed blue arrow in Fig. 5, and
if wi allocates x3i , x
4
i to Tj , there is a solid red arrow in
Fig. 5 Define a matrix A = [A1, · · · , A15] ∈ R8×56 with
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
w6
w7
w8
w9
w10
w11
w12
w13
w14
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7
T8
Fig. 5. Task allocation game: An edge from wi to Tj on this graph implies
that a part of worker wi’s output is allocated to task Tj .
Fig. 6. (a): The trajectories of player 1’s working output xj1,k, j = 1, · · · , 4,
which show the convergence of Algorithm 1. (b): The trajectories of player
1’s multiplier λ1,k .
Ai = [a
1
i , a
2
i , a
3
i , a
4
i ] ∈ R8×4 quantifying how the output of
worker wi is allocated to each task. Each column aki has only
one element being nonzero, and the jth element of a1i or a
2
i
is nonzero if there is a dashed blue arrow wi → Tj on Fig.
5, and the jth element of a3i or a
4
1 is nonzero if there is a
red arrow wi → Tj on Fig. 5. The nonzero elements in Ai
are randomly chosen from [0.5, 1]. It is required that the tasks
should be met by the working output of the players. Denote
C = col(C1, · · · , C8), then the workers have an equality
coupling constraint: Ax = C. The objective function of player
(worker) wi is fi(xi,x−i) = ci(xi)−RT (x)Aixi. Here, ci(xi)
is a cost function of worker wi and is taken as ci(xi) =∑4
s=1 max{qsi xsi 2 − ξsi xsi , lsixsi} + (pTi xi − di)2 + xTi Sixi.
R(x) = col(R1(x), · · · , R8(x)) is a vector function that maps
the workers’ output to the award price of each task, and
Rj(x) = κj − χj log([Ax]j + 1). Parameters of the problem
are randomly drawn as follows: Cj ∈ [1, 2], χj ∈ [0.1, 0.6],
κj ∈ [10, 20], qsi ∈ [1, 2], ξsi ∈ [6, 12], di ∈ [1, 2], and
lsi ∈ [1, 3]. pi ∈ R4 is a randomly generated stochastic vector,
Si ∈ R4×4 is a randomly generated positive definite matrix,
and each element of Bi is drawn from [1, 3]. The parameters
are numerically checked to ensure Assumption 1.
We apply Algorithm 1 to this problem, over a communica-
tion graph as in Fig. 1, without node 15 and its adjacent edge,
and with the remaining edges arbitrarily ordered. Each player
has a local Ci = 115C, and local step-sizes Ri, Hi, Wl that are
all diagonal matrices with nonzero elements uniformly drawn
from [4, 8], [0.2, 0.4] and [0.2, 0.4] respectively. The relaxation
step-size is taken as ρ = 1.1. The initial xi,0 is randomly
chosen within 0 ≤ xi,0 ≤ Bi, and initial λi, zl are chosen to
be zeros. The subgames are solved using subgradient methods
in [16] to get the exact NE xˆk, and each x˜k is chosen to be
the first point on the trajectory satisfying ||x˜k − xˆk|| < 1k2 .
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 6-7.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered GNE computation of monotone
games with affine coupling constraints. We proposed center-
free distributed algorithms for both equality and inequality
constraints, based on a preconditioned proximal point algo-
rithm. We decomposed the GNE computation into sequential
Fig. 7. (a): The trajectories of the consensus errors of local multipliers. (b)
The trajectories of violations of the coupling constraint Ax = C
NE computation of regularized subgames and local coordi-
nation of multipliers and auxiliary variables. We considered
inexactness in solving the subgames and incorporated relax-
ation steps. We proved their convergence by resorting to the
theory of proximal algorithms and averaged operators.
There are still a lot of promising open problems. Motivated
by [20] and [21], it is appealing to consider distributed GNE
seeking when players cannot observe all other players’ deci-
sions. Motivated by [5], [23] and [6], center-free GNE seeking
of monotone aggregative games with discrete-time algorithms
is still open. It is appealing to develop asynchronous dis-
tributed GNE computation algorithms with delayed informa-
tion, and consider the problem when the players interact over
switching and directed communication graphs. As important
is to consider computational GNE seeking algorithms together
with the mechanism design which can ensure that players
faithfully report their states and auxiliary variables, possibly
by providing proper incentive or punishment.
APPENDIX
Essentially, the proof of Theorem 3 utilizes the following
facts: Φ−1M is maximally monotone under the Φ−induced
norm || · ||Φ; RΦ−1M is a 12 -averaged operator; Proposition
4.25 of [28] for averaged operators and Robbins-Siegmund
lemma for sequence convergence, given as follows.
Lemma 1 (Proposition 23.7 of [28]): If operator A is
maximally monotone, then T = RA = (Id + A)−1 is firmly
nonexpasive, and domRA = Rm.
Lemma 2 (Proposition 4.25 of [28]): Given an operator
T and α ∈ (0, 1), then T ∈ A(α) is equivalent with any
following statements:
(i): ||Tx − Ty||2 ≤ ||x − y||2 − 1−αα ||(x − y) − (Tx −
Ty)||2,∀x, y ∈ Ω.
(ii): ||Tx − Ty||2 + (1 − 2α)||x − y||2 ≤ 2(1 − α)〈x −
y, Tx− Ty〉,∀x, y ∈ Ω.
Lemma 3 (Robbins-Siegmund): Suppose nonnegative se-
quences {αk}, {βk} and {vk} satisfy the recursive relations
αk+1 ≤ αk − βk + vk,∀k and
∑∞
k=1 vk < ∞, then {αk}
converges,
∑∞
k=1 βk <∞ and limk→∞ βk = 0.
Proof of Theorem 3: Φ($k − $ˆk) ∈ M$ˆk implies that
∃uk ∈M$ˆk such that Φ($k − $ˆk) = uk.
Since Φ is positive definite, $k − $ˆk = Φ−1uk. That
is $k − $ˆk ∈ Φ−1M$ˆk. Since Φ is positive definite and
M is maximally monotone, we have Φ−1M is maximally
monotone under the Φ−induced norm || · ||Φ. In fact, Φ is
positive definite and nonsingular. For any (x, u) ∈ graΦ−1M
and (y, v) ∈ graΦ−1M, Φu ∈ ΦΦ−1M(x) ∈ M(x) and
Φv ∈ ΦΦ−1M(y) ∈ M(y). Then 〈x − y, u − v〉Φ =
〈x− y,Φ(u− v)〉 ≥ 0,∀x, y ∈ domM, since M is monotone.
Therefore, Φ−1M is monotone under the Φ−induced inner
product 〈·, ·〉Φ. Furthermore, take (y, v) with y ∈ domM, and
〈x − y, u − v〉Φ ≥ 0, for any other (x, u) ∈ gra(Φ−1M).
For any (x, u˜) ∈ graM, we have (x,Φ−1u˜) ∈ gra(Φ−1M).
〈x−y,Φ(Φ−1u˜−v)〉 ≥ 0, or equivalently, 〈x−y, u˜−Φv)〉 ≥ 0.
Since M is maximally monotone, then (y,Φv) ∈ graM¯. We
conclude that v ∈ Φ−1B¯(y) which implies that Φ−1M is
maximally monotone under || · ||Φ. In the later proof, we will
use || · || for || · ||Φ.
Therefore, $ˆk = (Id + Φ−1M)−1$k. Denote T = (Id +
Φ−1M)−1, then T a firmly nonexpansive operator by Lemma
1. In other words, their exists a nonexpansive operator T
′
such
that T = 12 Id +
1
2T
′
. Hence $ˆk = T$k = 12$k +
1
2T
′
$k.
Moreover, given any $∗ ∈ zerΦ−1M, or equivalently, $∗ ∈
zerM, $∗ is a fixed point of T and T
′
, i.e., T$∗ = $∗ and
T
′
$∗ = $∗, with the definition of resolvent.
Denote $˘k+1 = $k + ρ($ˆk − $k). We have $˘k+1 =
$k +ρ(
1
2$k +
1
2T
′
$k−$k) = (1− ρ2 )$k + ρ2T
′
$k. Denote
T˜ = (1 − ρ2 )Id + ρ2T
′
, then T˜ ∈ A(ρ2 ) since ρ ∈ [1, 2).
Moreover, given any $∗ ∈ zerM we have T˜$∗ = (1 −
ρ
2 )$
∗ + ρ2T
′
$∗ = $∗ since $∗ is a fixed point of T
′
.
Given any $∗ ∈ zerM, with (i) of Lemma (2) we have,
||$˘k+1 −$∗||2 = ||T˜$k − T˜$∗||2
≤ ||$k −$∗||2 − 2−ρρ ||$k −$∗ − (T˜$k − T˜$∗)||2
= ||$k −$∗||2
(33)
Therefore, ||$˘k+1 − $∗|| ≤ ||$k − $∗||. We also have
||$˘k+1 −$k+1|| ≤ ρνk since $˘k+1 −$k+1 = ρ($ˆk − $˜k)
and ||$ˆk−$˜k|| ≤ νk due to Algorithm 3. Then by the triangle
inequality
||$k+1 −$∗|| ≤ ||$˘k+1 −$k+1||+ ||$˘k+1 −$∗||
≤ ||$k −$∗||+ ρνk
Since
∑∞
k=1 ρνk < ∞, we conclude that {||$k − $∗||}
converges for any given $∗ ∈ zerM with Lemma 3. Hence,
{||$˘k−$∗||} and {||$k−$∗||} are both bounded sequences,
and we denote c4 = supk ||$˘k −$∗||.
Since T = 12 Id +
1
2T
′
is firmly nonexpansive, Id − T =
1
2 Id +
1
2 (−T
′
) is also firmly nonexpansive. By (ii) of Lemma
2, Id− T ∈ A( 12 ) if and only if ∀$1, $2 ∈ domT,
||(Id− T )$1 − (Id− T )$2||2
≤ 〈$1 −$2, (Id− T )$1 − (Id− T )$2〉 (34)
Hence, we have
||$˘k+1 −$∗||2 = ||$k + ρ(T$k −$k)−$∗||2
= ||$k − ρ(Id− T )$k −$∗||2
= ||$k −$∗||2 + ρ2||(Id− T )$k||2
−2ρ〈$k −$∗, (Id− T )$k − (Id− T )$∗〉
≤ ||$k −$∗||2 − (2ρ− ρ2)||(Id− T )$k||2
where the third equality follows from (Id − T )$∗ = 0 and
the last inequality follows from (34). Denote c6 = (2ρ− ρ2),
then we also have ||$˘k+1 −$k+1||2 ≤ ρ2ν2k and
||$k+1 −$∗||2 = ||$k+1 − $˘k+1 + $˘k+1 −$∗||2
≤ ρ2ν2k + ||$˘k+1 −$∗||2 + 2c4ρνk
≤ ||$k −$∗||2 − c6||$k − T$k||2 + ρ(ρνk + 2c4)νk
We have
∑∞
k=1(ρ
2νk+2ρc4)νk <∞ due to
∑∞
k=1 νk <∞.
By Lemma 3, we conclude that
∑∞
k=1 ||$k − T$k||2 < ∞,
and limk→∞$k − T$k = 0.
Since {||$k − $∗||} converges, {$k} is a bounded se-
quence. There exists a subsequence{$nk} that converges
to $´∗. Passing to limiting point of Algorithm 3, we have
T$´∗ = $´∗ by limnk→∞ T$nk − $nk = 0 and (Lipschitz)
continuity of T . Therefore, the limiting point $´∗ is a fixed
point of T and is a zero of M in (29). Setting $∗ = $´∗ in
(33), we have {||$k− $´∗||} is bounded and converges. Since
there exists a subsequence {$nk} that converges to $´∗, it
follows that {||$k − $´∗||} converges to zero. Therefore, the
whole sequence {$k} generated from Algorithm 3 with any
initial point converges to $∗, and $∗ ∈ zerM. 2
Proof of Theorem 4:
We first give some useful relations derived from Algorithm
3 when M = M¯e and Φ = Φe.
Write Φe($k − $ˆk) ∈ M¯e$ˆk in its componentwise form
R(x
′
k − xˆ
′
k)− ΛT (ηk − ηˆk) + ΛT (θk − θˆk)
∈ (NΩ¯ + ∂F )(xˆ
′
k) + Λ
T ηˆk − ΛT θˆk.
−Λ(x′k − xˆ
′
k) + 2H
−1(ηk − ηˆk) + V¯ (Z′k − Zˆ
′
k)
= −Λxˆ′k − V¯ Zˆ
′
k + b¯.
V¯ T (ηk − ηˆk) +W−1(Z′k − Zˆ
′
k) + V¯
T (θk − θˆk)
= V¯ T ηˆk − V¯ T θˆk.
Λ(x
′
k − xˆ
′
k) + 2H
−1(θk − θˆk) + V¯ (Z′k − Zˆ
′
k)
= Λxˆ
′
k + V¯ Zˆ
′
k − b¯.
(35)
Since R,H and W are positive definite, (35) gives
R(x
′
k − xˆ
′
k) ∈ (NΩ¯ + ∂F )(xˆ
′
k) + Λ
T (ηk − θk). (36)
ηˆk = ηk +
H
2
[V¯ Z
′
k − Λ(x
′
k − 2xˆ
′
k)− b¯]. (37)
Zˆ
′
k = Z
′
k +WV¯
T (ηk − 2ηˆk + θk). (38)
θˆk = θk +
H
2
[Λ(x
′
k − 2xˆ
′
k) + V¯ (Z
′
k − 2Zˆ
′
k) + b¯]. (39)
Denote
λ¯
′
k = ηk − θk −H(Λx
′
k + V¯ Z
′
k − b¯), (40)
then by (36)
Rx
′
k − ΛT (λ¯
′
k +H(Λx
′
k + V¯ Z
′
k − b¯)) ∈ (NΩ¯ + ∂F +R)xˆ
′
k.
(41)
Denote ˆ¯λ
′
k = ηˆk− θˆk−H(Λxˆ
′
k+ V¯ Zˆ
′
k− b¯). By (37) and (39),
we have
ˆ¯λ
′
k = ηk +
H
2 [V¯ Z
′
k − Λ(x
′
k − 2xˆ
′
k)− b¯]
−(θk + H2 [Λ(x
′
k − 2xˆ
′
k) + V¯ (Z
′
k − 2Zˆ
′
k) + b¯])
−H(Λxˆ′k + V¯ Zˆ
′
k − b¯)
= ηk − θk +H[−Λ(x′k − xˆ
′
k)]
= λ¯
′
k +H(Λx
′
k + V¯ Z
′
k − b¯) +H[−Λ(x
′
k − xˆ
′
k)]
= λ¯
′
k +H(Λxˆ
′
k + V¯ Z
′
k − b¯).
(42)
From (40), (42), ˆ¯λ
′
k = ηk − θk +H[−Λ(x
′
k − xˆ
′
k)].
Then by (38) and (37)
Zˆ
′
k = Z
′
k +WV¯
T (θk − ηk −H[V¯ Z′k − Λ(x
′
k − 2xˆ
′
k)− b¯])
= Z
′
k +WV¯
T (−ˆ¯λ′k +H[−Λ(x
′
k − xˆ
′
k)]
−H[V¯ Z′k − Λ(x
′
k − 2xˆ
′
k)− b¯])
= Z
′
k −WV¯ T (ˆ¯λ
′
k +H[Λxˆ
′
k + V¯ Z
′
k − b¯]).
(43)
Then we prove (31) by induction. Firstly, we choose x
′
0 =
x0, η0 = λ¯0 +H(Λx0 + V¯
T λ¯0 − b¯),Z′0 = Z0, θ0 = 0. Hence
(31) holds at k = 0.
Suppose (31) is true at time k, then λ¯
′
k defined in (40) has
λ¯
′
k = λ¯k. We can choose xˆ
′
k = xˆk to satisfy equation (41) due
to x
′
k = xk, Z
′
k = Zk and (17). Then we choose x˜
′
k = x˜k
such that ||xˆ′k − x˜
′
k|| = ||xˆk − x˜k|| ≤ µk. Thereby, we have
x
′
k+1 = x
′
k + ρ(x˜
′
k − x
′
k) = xk+1.
Recall that ηˆk and θˆk are generated by (37) and (39) from
ηk and θk. Due to (42), (31) and xˆ
′
k = xˆk we have:
ˆ¯λ
′
k = λ¯
′
k +H(Λxˆ
′
k + V¯ Z
′
k − b¯)
= λ¯k +H(Λxˆk + V¯ Zk − b¯).
(44)
By (17) we also have ˜¯λk = λ¯k +H(Λx˜k + V¯ Zk − b¯). Hence
˜¯λk − ˆ¯λ′k = HΛ(x˜k − xˆk). By (43)
Zˆ
′
k = Z
′
k −WV¯ T (ˆ¯λ
′
k +H[Λxˆ
′
k + V¯ Z
′
k − b¯])
= Zk −WV¯ T (ˆ¯λ′k +H[Λxˆk + V¯ Zk − b¯]).
(45)
We choose Z˜
′
k = Z˜k where Z˜k = Zk−WV¯ T (˜¯λk+H(Λx˜k+
V¯ Zk − b¯) due to (17), so that
Z˜
′
k − Zˆ
′
k = Z˜k − Zˆ
′
k
= −WV¯ T (˜¯λk − ˆ¯λ′k)−WV¯ THΛ(x˜k − xˆk)
= −2WV¯ THΛ(x˜k − xˆk).
(46)
Therefore, ∃c1 > 0, such that ||Z˜′k−Zˆ
′
k|| ≤ c1µk. Since Z˜
′
k =
Z˜k and Z
′
k = Zk, we have Z
′
k+1 = Z
′
k+ρ(Z˜
′
k−Z
′
k) = Z
k+1.
Denote ˜¯λ
′
k = η˜k− θ˜k−H(Λx˜
′
k + V¯ Z˜
′
k− b¯). Then we want
to find η˜k, θ˜k with ||η˜k − ηˆk|| ≤ c2µk, ||θ˜k − θˆk|| ≤ c3µk
such that ˜¯λk = ˜¯λ
′
k. Suppose θ˜k and η˜k are chosen to ensure
η˜k − θ˜k −H(Λx˜′k + V¯ Z˜
′
k − b¯) = ηˆk − θˆk −H(Λxˆ
′
k + V¯ Zˆ
′
k −
b¯) +HΛ(x˜k − xˆk). Then due to (17) and (44),
˜¯λk = λ¯k +H(Λx˜k + V¯ Zk − b¯)
= ˆ¯λ
′
k −H(Λxˆk + V¯ Zk − b¯) +H(Λx˜k + V¯ Zk − b¯)
= ˆ¯λ
′
k +HΛ(x˜k − xˆk)
= ηˆk − θˆk −H(Λxˆ′k + V¯ Zˆ
′
k − b¯) +HΛ(x˜k − xˆk)
= η˜k − θ˜k −H(Λx˜′k + V¯ Z˜
′
k − b¯) = ˜¯λ
′
k.
(47)
Hence, let θ˜k and η˜k be chosen as,
η˜k = ηˆk +HΛ(x˜k − xˆk) + 12HV¯ (Z˜
′
k − Zˆ
′
k).
θ˜k = θˆk −HΛ(x˜k − xˆk)− 12HV¯ (Z˜
′
k − Zˆ
′
k).
(48)
Obviously, in this case ∃c2 > 0, c3 > 0 such that ||η˜k −
ηˆk|| ≤ c2µk, ||θ˜k− θˆk|| ≤ c3µk. Moreover, from (47) we have
˜¯λ
′
k =
˜¯λk. Hence, we obtain that
λ¯
′
k+1 = ηk+1 − θk+1 −H(Λx
′
k+1 + V¯ Z
′
k+1 − b¯)
= (1− ρ)ηk + ρη˜k − [(1− ρ)θk + ρθ˜k]
−H(Λ[(1− ρ)x′k + ρx˜
′
k] + V¯ [(1− ρ)Z
′
k + ρZ˜
′
k]− b¯)
= (1− ρ)[ηk − θk −H(Λx′k + V¯ Z
′
k − b¯)]
+ρ[η˜k − θ˜k −H(Λx˜′k + V¯ Z˜
′
k − b¯)]
= (1− ρ)λ¯k + ρ˜¯λk = λ¯k+1.
Therefore, when (31) holds at time k, it also holds at
time k + 1. Thus, we have shown by induction that given
sequences col(xk,Zk, λ¯k) generated from Algorithm 1 with
initial points x0,Z0, λ¯0 and {µk}, we can find sequences
$k = col(x
′
k, ηk,Z
′
k, θk) generated from Algorithm 3 with
νk ≤
√
1 + c21 + c
2
2 + c
2
3µk such that (31) holds. Since∑∞
k=1 µk < ∞, we have
∑∞
k=1 νk < ∞, and the conclusion
follows. 2
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